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ABSTRACT. We consider ﬁxed and asking price strategies in the con-
text of selling an asset with Bernoullian updating of the seller’s subjective
probability of sale at a given price. The determination of optimal ﬁxed,
asking and endogenous reservation prices is discussed under risk-neutral-
ity and expected utility maximisation. With risk-neutrality, the optimal
asking price exceeds the optimal ﬁxed price when the expected gain is
a strictly concave function. The seller’s choice between the ﬁxed and the
asking price strategies depends on several factors: the expected cost of
haggling, price competition and the seller’s attitude towards risk.
KEY WORDS: ﬁxed price, asking price, price discounts, reservation
price, risk attitude.
1. INTRODUCTION
The problem of optimal selling strategies has for some time
been recognised as an interesting area for research.
Following Telser (1973) and Rothschild (1974) on the buyer’s
problem of optimal search for the lowest prices, Riley and
Zeckhauser (1983) and Rosenﬁeld et al. (1983) analysed the
optimal strategy for selling an asset. Although the motiva-
tions of the last two papers are different they have some com-
mon features. Both refer to a situation akin to an owner of
an antique shop selling a valuable item over which the seller
has in mind a subjective probability distribution of obtainable
prices. After each bid from potential buyers, the seller decides
whether or not to sell, weighing the possibility of a better bid
against the cost of waiting. If the seller declines to sell the
item, the buyer reveals the true value to the seller which leads
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the seller to a Bayesian updating of the subjective probability
distribution. Ultimately, the item is sold when a buyer meets
the updated reservation price.
The bulk of the literature in the 1970s and 1980s was
devoted to this Bayesian updating process in the context of
a sequence of bids. Bayesian updating models deal with the
optimal selling strategy in a static framework. The seller faces
a succession of bids within a single period and her subjective
probability density function (pdf) of obtainable price from
the buyers,f (P ), is deﬁned with respect to the market in that
period alone. The terms ‘current’ and ‘future’ denote positions
in the queue, but they do not have a proper temporal conno-
tation. Although a discount factor is sometimes used for suc-
cessive encounters, the fact that waiting itself may affect the
probability of selling a good is ignored.
Suppose a seller announces a ﬁxed price,P ∗. It may take
a long time to sell the asset at that price. Given positive
time-discounting, the buyer may be able to obtain a price
discount. However, Riley and Zeckhauser, who make allow-
ances for bargaining, argue that there is a strong case for a
‘take-it-or-leave-it’ pricing policy. Thanassoulis (2004), in con-
trast to the bulk of literature in the 1970s and 1980s, uses the
economic theory of commodity bundling as the foundation of
his paper, and shows that haggling may be part of the optimal
selling strategy in the multi-product case. For example, pack-
age tour operators may offer clients a holiday at a reduced
rate in a chosen country, the exact resort being unspeciﬁed
and to be chosen later depending on the state of availability.
By doing so, the operators may increase their proﬁts. In the
context of multi-product (substitutes) monopolists, an optimal
selling strategy may involve haggling over the type of prod-
uct (substitutes) to be delivered. In our paper, we are con-
cerned with haggling over price in the context of selling a
single asset. However, it is interesting to note that some of
the results obtained in Thanassoulis are qualitatively similar
to some of our results obtained by using a more traditional
approach.
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If one intends to sell an asset, like a house or a used
car, the seller’s subjective probability distribution of the buy-
ers’ valuation of the asset (sometimes referred to as the dis-
tribution of the asset price) is derived from a signiﬁcant
amount of objective assessment. Before putting the asset on
the market, the seller gathers information about the sale of
similar items from newspapers, magazines and the internet,
and seeks advice from surveyors and experts, so that she has
an idea about the probability distribution of the asset-price
for the foreseeable future. She is not so much worried about
a mistake in predicting the pdf, as in determining the opti-
mal asking price and reservation price. When a seller adver-
tises a moderately expensive item (e.g. a house, car or yacht),
she also speciﬁes the asking price. Assuming (as we do) that
the buyers make their bids sequentially, if the seller asks for
the reservation price, she will not get a higher price. The gap
between the asking price and the reservation price is called
the price discount: the maximum reduction in price that the
buyer can get. An analysis of strategies concerning asking
prices and price discounts has important practical signiﬁcance.
For instance, in UK (excluding Scotland) and in many other
countries, the housing market operates on the basis of ask-
ing prices. The asking price is generally different from the
reservation price, known only to the seller. Once the seller
announces a price for the asset, she may decide not to accept
a price less than the announced price (ﬁxed price strategy)
or she may accept a price equal to, or above, a reserva-
tion price (asking price strategy). Once the asking price is
announced, the seller must sell the property to the ﬁrst buyer
agreeing to buy the property at the asking price. There is an
implicit assumption underlying the model presented here. The
seller may have a pre-determined personal reservation price.
Throughout, the paper we assume that the personal reserva-
tion price is less than the (endogenously determined) mini-
mum acceptable price.
There is another important role of ‘time’ in a selling strat-
egy. Given the asking price of the seller, the probability of
a sale in period 1 (the current period) may be low, but if
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the seller is prepared to wait, the probability of sale over
the period may increase signiﬁcantly (a comparison is drawn
with Bernoulli trials). In determining the optimal price for the
asset, the seller should consider this inter-temporal aspect of
her strategy. Horowitz’s (1992) empirical work on asking and
reservation prices for houses is based on a simple theoreti-
cal model, which has some similarities with ours: an expected
utility maximising, risk-neutral seller with a speciﬁc utility
function sets the asking price and the reservation price of
a house.1 However, whilst Horowitz assumes the conditional
probability of selling a house to be invariant with respect to
time, in our model, the more a seller waits, the higher is the
probability that she ﬁnds a buyer over the waiting period.
This Bernoullian probability updating plays a crucial role in
our paper. A discussion on the choice between the ﬁxed price
strategy and the asking price strategy together with the impact
of non-risk-neutrality on the choice (two central themes in
our paper), are also absent in Horowitz.
In this paper, we discuss the determination of the opti-
mal asking price and the factors, which determine the extent
of the price discount. The attitude of the seller towards risk
has an important role to play here. Once we understand that
the possibility of waiting may cause ’haggling’, the range of
haggling (between the asking and reservation prices) depends
on the seller’s attitude to risk (whether she is risk-averse,
risk-neutral or risk-prone). Hence, it is not possible for the
buyer to pre-determine the reservation price. This enforces
the possibility of price-negotiations. Two important aspects of
the selling strategy are discussed in detail: (i) the relation-
ship between the optimal asking price, price discounts and the
optimal ﬁxed price, and (ii) the factors inﬂuencing the seller
to adopt a ‘ﬁxed price’ policy. The layout of the paper is as
follows. Sections 2 and 3 introduce, respectively, the ﬁxed and
1Naturally, the strategy of selling houses is a major area of interest. Albright
(1977) uses the Bayesian updating technique to discuss the house selling strat-
egy whilst empirical studies include Saas (1988) and Zuehlke (1987), amongst
others.
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asking price strategies under risk-neutrality and analyses them
in each case. Section 4 considers the question of when to hag-
gle. Section 5 examines the effect of allowing more general
risk attitudes to the relative attractiveness of the two selling
strategies. Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
2. OPTIMAL FIXED PRICE: A RISK-NEUTRAL SELLER
Suppose the seller of an asset has a continuous (truncated)
subjective probability distribution of buyers’ valuations of the
asset in mind with the domain I = [a, b], b > a > 0. If the
seller sets the price at a, the asset should be sold immediately
(in period 1). The price ‘b’ represents the upper limit of the
prices for which the asset may perceivably be sold. In the con-
text of a probability distribution, P denotes the buyers’ eval-
uation (demand price), whilst in terms of pricing the asset, P
refers to the seller’s asking price. We assume that the subjec-
tive pdf of the asset price in each period remains unchanged
over time. In other words, the seller expects the nature of
the market to remain the same over the foreseeable future.
The seller’s subjective distribution of buyers’ valuations may
be affected by various factors in the future, e.g. a long period
of waiting or new information regarding the buyers’ valua-
tions. When a revision is required, the seller will recalculate
and reset the asking price. However, the seller is assumed to
be myopic in the sense that the subjective distribution for all
periods in the future is based on current information: the
optimisation problem faced by the seller in this model is con-
ditioned by her present information of the market. This limi-
tation stems from her inability to predict future changes in the
market or the length of time for which the asset will remain
unsold in the market.
We denote the seller’s subjective pdf of the buyers’ val-
uations of the asset asf (P ). We deﬁne, F(P ) = ∫ P
a
f (π)dπ ,
F(a) = 0 and F(b) = 1. The probability of the asset being
sold within any one period at price P is p= 1−F(P ). Given
the seller’s ﬁxed price P , the probability of selling the asset
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in period N is (1 − p)N−1p. If the asset is sold at price P
in period N(N = 1, . . . ,∞), the discounted present-day value
of the asset is P(1+ r)1−N , where r < 1 is the market interest
rate. We assume the capital market to be perfect. If the seller
announces a ﬁxed price P , the expected return from the sale
is,
E =
∞∑
N=1
P(1+ r)1−N(1−p)N−1p
=pP
∞∑
N=1
(
1−p
1+ r
)N−1
=P (1+ r)p
r +p . (1)
Since, p ≤ 1, P ≥ E. Note, if the seller adopts a ﬁxed price
strategy, the ﬁxed price P must be such that E ≥ a. To begin
with, we assume that the seller is risk-neutral. A risk-neutral
seller maximises the expected gain E. If P ∗ is the optimal
ﬁxed price, E∗ is the expected value from selling the asset at
this price. The properties of E turn out to be of importance.
In particular, we note that E may not be a concave function
of P everywhere.
LEMMA 1. E is a strictly concave function of P everywhere
if and only if,
2
dp
dP
+P d
2
p
dP 2
− 2P
r +p
[
dp
dP
]2
<0. (2)
Proof of Lemma 1. Differentiating E twice with respect to P
and setting it less than 0, we get,
2r
dp
dP
+P
r(r +p)2 d
2
p
dP 2 −2r(r +p)
[
dp
dP
]2
(r +p)2 <0.
Further simplifying we obtain (2). QED
Since dp/dP =−f (P )<0, a sufﬁcient condition for E being
a strictly concave function of P everywhere within any arbi-
trary non-negative domain I is that d2p/dP 2 = −f ′(P ) is
non-positive everywhere in the domain I . In other words,
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if f ′(P ) = 0 (a uniform distribution) or f ′(P ) > 0 ∀P , E is
strictly concave everywhere. The condition f ′(P ) > 0 implies
that F(P ), the probability of not ﬁnding a customer in a
particular period, increases at a faster rate as P increases.
To require E to be concave over any arbitrary non-negative
domain is asking a lot. Hence, the class of distributions which
comply with the condition is very limited.
However, the concavity of E over the price range [a, b]
depends not only on the nature, and parameters, of the (trun-
cated) distribution function but also on the boundary values,
a and b (both are non-negative and b is ﬁnite). E may be
concave for almost any well-known distribution (e.g. exponen-
tial, Gamma and Beta) when truncated over a suitable price
range [a, b]. Without any loss of generality we can always lin-
early transform P such that, a = 0 and b equals any arbi-
trary positive value, depending on the unit of measurement
chosen. To illustrate the above argument, let us consider the
price range [a, b] = [0,0.8] and a truncated exponential dis-
tribution function, F(P )= 1− e−P + e−bP/b, with the density
function, f (P )= e−P + e−b/b. From lemma 1, E is concave if
(r +p)[d2p/dP 2]−2[dp/dP ]2<0 (a sufﬁcient condition). Since,
by assumption,r < 1, r +p< 2. It is easy to check that d
2
p
dP 2 =
e−P <2e
−Pe−b
b
< [ dpdP ]
2 for b≤0.8.
In general, for a unimodal density function, let M(>a) be
the mode. From lemma 1, E is concave when f /(P )≥0. It is
easy to see that possible values of b(>M) exist such that at
b, Mod(d2p/dP 2)= f /(P )< [f (P )]2. In other words, the con-
cavity of E depends on the parameters a, b and the nature,
as well as the parameters, of the truncated density (distribu-
tion) function. This applies to any well-known unimodal dis-
tribution function deﬁned over P >0.
PROPOSITION 1. For a risk-neutral seller, (i) the optimal
ﬁxed price P ∗ must be less than b, (ii) if P ∗ >a, P ∗ satisﬁes
the implicit (open loop) relationship,
P ∗ = p(p+ r)
rf (P ∗)
. (3)
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Proof of Proposition 1. (i) When P =b (i.e. p=0), E =0. For
P = a, E = a. Obviously, P = a is a better choice than P =
b. Therefore, the optimal ﬁxed price P ∗ must be less than b.
(ii) A seller adopting the ﬁxed price strategy sets P ∗ to maxi-
mise the expected earning, E. Differentiating E with respect
to P , setting dE/dP = 0, and noting dp/dP = −f (P ), we
get,
0=p+P f (P )p−f (P )(p+ r)
p+ r ,
which yields (3). QED
If (2) is satisﬁed, the optimal ﬁxed price is unique. The
implicit relationship (3) is useful in calculating the optimum
ﬁxed price. For example, suppose a property in the price
range I = [$50k,$60k] is to be sold, f (P ) is a uniform pdf
and the market interest rate is r = 0.05. In this case, (3)
yields, 0.05(10)−1P = [(60−P)/10]2 +0.05[(60−P)/10], or, P 2 −
121P −3630=0. Solving the quadratic equation for P , in the
relevant range [$50k,$60k], we get P ∗ = $55k with expected
yield, E∗ =$52.5k.
The ﬁxed price strategy is usually a sub-optimal strategy.
Barring any special reason, if a buyer places a ﬁrm bid some-
where between the ﬁxed price (P ) and the expected return (E),
her bid should be accepted by the risk-neutral seller. Riley
and Zeckhauser (p. 267) note: ‘Antique stores may post prices
and suggest on casual inquiry that they are ﬁxed. These prices
may be cut, or extras thrown in, for sophisticated buyers.’
Hence, in order to make the ﬁxed price strategy work, the
seller may have to appoint a selling agent. This is a strategy to
keep the buyer at arm’s length. However, if a seller is selling
several assets of a similar nature, she may refuse any price-
discount in an attempt to convince the market that, for her,
‘ﬁxed price’ means ﬁxed price. She hopes that this will estab-
lish a reputation and help her avoid any future cost of hag-
gling with other assets.
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3. OPTIMAL ASKING PRICE: THE RISK-NEUTRAL SELLER
In this section we consider the asking price strategy. If P is
the asking price, the risk-neutral seller may wish to accept a
price less than P . The seller will not accept a price worth
less than E, because her (discounted) expected return would
be higher if she is prepared to wait. However, her reservation
price may be more than E. We denote the reservation price as
M. Given P and M, the expected yield from the asking price
strategy is given by,
V =E +
∞∑
N=1
∫ P
M
[(π −E)(1+ r)1−N f (π)∫ P
M
f (π)dπ
dπ ]
[
∫ P
M
f (π)dπ ][1−
∫ P
M
f (π)dπ ]N−1
=E +
∫ P
M
[(π −E)f (π)]dπ (1+ r)
r + ∫ P
M
f (π)dπ
=E +
∫ P
M
[(π −E)f (π)]dπ (1+ r)
r +φ . (4)
where, φ = ∫ P
M
f (π)dπ . Equation (4) needs explanation. The
asset will be sold in one of two ways. First, a buyer may
agree to pay the asking price P . Given bids are assumed to
arrive sequentially, no buyer needs to offer a price more than
P . The expected return from such an event over time is E, the
ﬁrst term in (4). The second term in (4) appears due to the
fact that a potential buyer may negotiate a price π(M ≤ π ≤
P). This is the expected additional gain from the ﬂexibility of
the asking price policy over the expected yield from the ﬁxed
price policy. The expected discounted surplus over E is calcu-
lated by using conditional probabilities, hence we divide f (π)
by φ, and the probability weights add up to 1. The risk-neu-
tral seller will set P and M in such a way that the expected
yield V is maximised. Since P lies in a compact interval of the
real line and V is continuous, the solution will exist. The inte-
rior solution must satisfy two non-linear constraints ∂V/∂P =
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0 and ∂V/∂M = 0. Explicit (closed loop) solutions for P and
V in the general case can not be obtained.
DEFINITION 1. The pure price discount (ppd) is deﬁned as
the difference between the asking price and the reservation
price (minimum acceptable price) of a risk-neutral seller.
We use the adjective ‘pure’ in order to distinguish ppd from
the price discount acceptable to a risk-averse or risk-loving
seller, which will be shown later as a sum of ppd and a
risk-attitude factor. Except for the extreme case, P = a, the
seller will accept a discount on the asking price, i.e. the buyer
should always bargain.
PROPOSITION 2. For any asking price P , let the pure price
discount be denoted by δ(P ). Then,
δ(P )=P r(1−p)
r +p −
∫ P
M
(π −E)f (π)dπ
r +φ . (5)
Proof of Proposition 2. For a given value of P , the value of
E is known by (1). First we prove that given any asking price
P , the corresponding optimal reservation price M satisﬁes the
implicit relationship (6),
0= ∂V/∂M =−(M −E)f (M)(1+ r)
r +φ
+f (M)(1+ r)
∫ P
M
(π −E)f (π)dπ
(r +φ)2 ,
which yields,
M =E +
∫ P
M
(π −E)f (π)dπ
r +φ . (6)
Since δ(P )=P −M = (P −E)− (M −E), Proposition 2 follows
by calculating (P −E), using (1) and (6). QED
The above proposition and the following remarks are valid
for any arbitrary asking price and, consequently, at the opti-
mal asking price.
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REMARK 1. From (6) it is clear that for any asking price, P ,
the reservation price, M is more than the expected yield E, if P
is treated as given.
REMARK 2. Given any asking price P , the reservation price
M is likely to be signiﬁcantly closer to V than E. This can be
shown as follows. From (4) and (6), by eliminating the expres-
sion involving integrals and simplifying, we get,
V −M
M −E = r. (7)
The interest rate is usually a small percentage. Hence, by (7),
M should be signiﬁcantly closer to V than E.
REMARK 3. If ∂E/∂P < 0 in the neighbourhood of the opti-
mal asking price, locally ∂M/∂P <0 for P and M satisfying the
condition ∂V/∂M =0.
To see this, differentiating Equation(7) with respect to P and
rearranging terms yields, ∂V/∂P + r∂E/∂P = (1+ r)∂M/∂P . At
the optimal asking price, ∂V/∂P =0. Hence, the result follows.
This result will be useful later on.
PROPOSITION 3. Given an asking price P , a < P < b, an
increase in the interest rate will reduce the reservation price M
and consequently the pure price discount δ(P ) will increase.
Proof of Proposition 3. Partially differentiating E with respect
to r, with P given, we get,
∂E/∂r =P p
2 −p
(r +p)2 <0.
Partially differentiating M with respect to r, using (1) in (6),
we obtain,
∂M
∂r
= ∂E
∂r
+ −(M −E)f (M)
∂M
∂r
− ∂E
∂r
φ
r +φ −
∫ P
M
(π −E)f (π)dπ
(r +φ)2 ,
∂M
∂r
[1+ (M −E)f (M)
r +φ ]=
∂E
∂r
(1− φ
r +φ )
−
∫ P
M
(π −E)f (π)dπ
(r +φ)2 .
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The coefﬁcient of ∂M/∂r is positive and both terms on the
right-hand side are negative. Hence ∂M/∂r < 0 and for any
given P , δ(P )=P −M must increase with an increase in the
interest rate r. QED
It is a common belief that sellers set asking prices above
the optimal ﬁxed price because sellers know that potential
buyers will haggle to buy the asset. If the asking price is
lower, it may seem that the seller can always set the asking
price equal to the higher ﬁxed price and keep the same res-
ervation price so that they can sell the asset to the customers
offering to buy the asset at the reservation price or more. This
is not correct. A higher asking price affects the inter-temporal
probabilities, i.e. it affects the probability of the future event
where the asset may be sold at a price less than the asking
price. For example, the probability of selling an asset in the
period N is pN =p(1−p)N−1. Differentiating with respect to
p, we can see that dpN/dp > 0 if 1 − p > (N − 1)p and vice
versa.
Next we prove that if (2) in Lemma 1 holds, the optimal
asking price is greater than the optimal ﬁxed price.
PROPOSITION 4. If E is a strictly concave function of P and
r <1, the optimal asking price will be greater than the optimal
ﬁxed price.
Proof of Proposition 4. At the optimal asking price,
∂V
∂P
= ∂E
∂P
+
(1+ r)
[
(P −E)f (P )− ∂E
∂P
φ
]
r +φ
−(1+ r)f (P )
∫ P
M
(π −E)f (π)dπ
(r +φ)2 =0.
Therefore, using (6),
∂E
∂P
[
(1+ r)φ
r +φ −1
]
= (1+ r)f (P )
r +φ [(P −E)− (M −E)].
Given φ < 1 and r < 1, the coefﬁcient of ∂E/∂P is negative.
On the right-hand side, the term within the bracket equals
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a b*PEˆ Pˆ*E Mˆ
55.3 55.96
Vˆ
Pure price 
discount
60
Figure 1. An illustration of the optimal asking price, Pˆ , ﬁxed price, P ∗, and
the pure price discount, δ(P ), in $000.
P − M > 0. Hence, at the optimal asking price ∂E/∂P must
be strictly negative. If E is a strictly concave function of P ,
the optimal asking price, which maximises V , must be greater
than the optimal ﬁxed price, which maximises E. QED
To illustrate, consider the example of the property seller
introduced in Section 2, for which the pdf of offers is uni-
form and bounded between $50k and $60k. Imposing these
assumptions in (6), yields, M = E + {(P + M)(P − M) − 2E
(P −M)}/{20[r + (P −M)/10]}. Substituting into (7), using (1)
and re-arranging, yields an expression for V in terms of P .
Maximising with respect to P yields Pˆ = 58.94 (where Pˆ is
the optimal asking price). Figure 1 reports the optimum price,
Pˆ , expected value, Vˆ , and reservation price, Mˆ, for the asking
price strategy along with the relevant values for the optimum
ﬁxed price strategy (derived in Section 2). Note, since we are
assuming a uniform distribution, E is strictly concave, and the
optimal asking price is greater than the optimal ﬁxed price, as
expected.
From proposition 4, we get,
P =M + θ, where θ = ∂E
∂P
r
1+ r
(φ −1)
f (P )
. (8)
When E is a concave function of P , the magnitudes as well as
the signs of ∂θ/∂P and ∂θ/∂r, at the optimal P , determine the
effects of a change in the interest rate on the asking price, the
minimum acceptable price and the price discount. In general,
the signs of the two derivatives depend on the parameters of
the model. Note, at the optimal solution, when M is optimally
adjusted, θ = ∂(P ). Figure 2, illustrates the case of ∂θ/∂P < 1
given r and ∂θ/∂r >0 given P . The curve MM represents the
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P
P
P’
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e
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Figure 2. The effect of an increase in the interest rate on the reservation price
(M) when ∂θ/∂P <1 and ∂θ/∂r >0.
combination of M and P for ∂V/∂M =0. Since ∂E/∂P <0 at
the optimal solution when E is concave, by remark 3 of prop-
osition 2, MM has a negative slope in the neighbourhood of
the optimal solution. By proposition 3, MM shifts downwards
to M ′M ′ with an increase in r. The curve PP represents the
combinations of M and P for ∂V/∂P = 0. When ∂θ/∂P < 1
for a given r, PP has a positive slope. The PP curve shifts
downwards to P ′P ′ when ∂θ/∂r >0 because for any particular
value of P , the value of M will be smaller by Equation (8).
The optimal solution moves from e to e′. The minimum ask-
ing price in this case is lower. However, the effects on P and
∂(P ) depend on the relative extent of shifts in PP and MM.
4. WHEN TO HAGGLE AND WHEN TO HOLD FIRM: ASKING
PRICE VERSUS FIXED PRICE
When should the seller adopt a ﬁxed price policy and under
what circumstances should the seller allow potential buyers to
haggle? There is evidently a cost of haggling to the seller in
terms of the value of the time and energy spent. For simplic-
ity, we assume that the expected cost of haggling is constant,
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c. From an announced price P , the seller expects to gain G=
V − E, from adopting the asking price strategy rather than
treating P as a ﬁxed price. The expected net gain from the
asking price strategy is expressed as,
G=V −E = (1+ r)
r +φ
∫ P
M
[(π −M)f (π)]dπ. (9)
Given that E∗ denotes the expected yield associated with the
optimal ﬁxed price P ∗, the risk-neutral seller will allow bar-
gaining if V (P )− c>E∗, i.e. E −E∗ +G>c, and will adopt a
ﬁxed price policy if E−E∗ +G<c. It is worthwhile analysing
(9) in detail. Since P ≥ V ≥ M ≥ E, if the difference between
P and E is very small, G will be very small and the seller
is likely to adopt a ‘ﬁxed price’ policy. Note, E∗ ≥E because
E∗ is the maximum value of E in (1). There are two interest-
ing situations when the difference between P and E is likely
to be very small. First, note that P − E = P(1 − p)r/(p + r)
and (1−p)r/(p + r)≤ 1. Hence, if the asking price P is very
small, the difference between P and E is very small. Usually,
for inexpensive items, the difference between the asking price
and the minimum acceptable price is very low so that G is
very small and the seller is not likely to negotiate prices on
such items. In the case of expensive items, the gap between the
asking price and the minimum acceptable price may be wide.
In this case G may be large enough, such that E−E∗ +G>c
and the seller adopts the asking price policy. In real life, bar-
gaining is quite customary in selling expensive assets. Second,
suppose the asset is being sold in a fairly competitive mar-
ket such that the price range, b−a, is very small. If P is the
average asking price, an arbitrarily small price discount on P
will lead to an immediate sale of the asset, i.e. M is arbitrarily
close to P . In such cases, G is very small and the sellers are
likely to adopt a ’ﬁxed price’ strategy.
PROPOSITION 5. The following observations establish a link
between the ﬁxed price strategy and the asking price strategy:
(i) The asking price strategy emulates the ﬁxed price strategy
BISWAS MCHARDY Asking Price and Price Discounts
Originally published in Theory and Decision (2007) 62:281-301 (c) Springer 
 
                                                            31
when, at the optimal asking price P , ∂E/∂P is arbitrarily close
to 0. (ii) If the optimal asking price is P =a, the seller adopts
a ﬁxed price strategy. (iii) If the optimal asking price is P =b,
the optimal price discount, ∂(P )> 0 and M ≥Pφ, which is the
expected value of the buying offers in the current period.
Proof of Proposition 5. Since at the optimal solution, θ =∂(P ),
we can rewrite Eq. (8) as,
∂(P )= ∂E
∂P
r
1+ r
(φ −1)
f (P )
=
[
pr
r +p −
Pf (P )r2
(r +p)2
]
φ −1
f (P )
.
(i) If the optimal asking price is arbitrarily close to the opti-
mal ﬁxed price (as in the case of an almost perfectly compet-
itive market with a negligible variance in P), ∂E/∂P is close
to 0 at the optimal asking price. As ∂E/∂P → 0, ∂(P ) → 0
and the optimal asking price strategy emulates the ﬁxed price
strategy. Hence, the ﬁxed price strategy may be treated as a
special case of the asking price strategy. (ii) When the opti-
mal asking price is P = a, the seller expects to sell the asset
in period 1 at the asking price. Hence, ∂(P )= 0. (iii) M <b,
otherwise V = 0. Therefore, ∂(P ) > 0.When P = b, the proba-
bility of sale at that price is 0. Substituting p=0 in the above
equation we get ∂(P )≤P(1−φ). This implies M ≥Pφ. QED
5. ATTITUDE TOWARDS RISK AND THE PRICE DISCOUNT
In the last two sections, we analysed the behaviour of a risk-
neutral seller maximising the expected return from the sale of
an asset. In this section we drop the assumption of risk-neu-
trality. In the context of the ﬁxed price strategy, if the ﬁxed
price is P ∗, the expected utility from sale is,
E(U)=
∞∑
N=1
U(P ∗)(1+ρ)1−Np(1−p)N−1 (10)
=
∞∑
N=1
U(P ∗)p
[
1−p
1+ρ
]N−1
=U(P ∗)p(1+ρ)
p+ρ (U ≥0,U
′ >0).
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The rate at which future utilities are discounted is given by
ρ. Except in the case of P ∗ = a (i.e. p = 1), E(U) < U(P ∗).
This implies that whatever the seller’s attitude towards risk
(risk-averse or risk-prone), the possibility of a price discount
under the asking price strategy always exists. The certainty
equivalent price of E(U) is P˜ , where U(P˜ )=E(U). Under the
ﬁxed price strategy, P will be set in such a way that E(U)
is maximised. In the context of the asking price strategy, the
expected yield is given by,
VU =E(U)+
∞∑
N=1
∫ P
M
[U(π)−E(U)](1+ρ)1−N f (π)∫ P
M
f (π)dπ
dπ
[∫ P
M
f (π)dπ
][
1−
∫ P
M
f (π)dπ
]N−1
=E(U)+
∫ P
M
[U(π)−E(U)]f (π)dπ (1+ρ)
ρ +φ . (11)
The expected utility maximising seller will set the asking price
P and the reservation price M at levels which maximise VU .
The price discount, δ˜(P ), is the difference between the asking
price and the reservation price (P −M), as deﬁned in Section
2, but in the context of different possible attitudes to risk. The
expected net gain from the asking price strategy over the ﬁxed
price strategy, for any given P , is,
GU =VU −E(U)=
∫ P
M
[U(π)−E(U)]f (π)dπ (1+ρ)
ρ +φ . (12)
If the seller is risk-averse (risk-prone), by the Arrow-Pratt
criterion,2 we know that the expected utility from uncer-
tain returns is less (more) than the utility from the expected
return. The two are equal under risk-neutrality. Further note,
as previously discussed, E(U) is obtained from a ﬁxed price
scenario.
2See Pratt (1964). For a discussion of the generalised Arrow-Pratt measures
of risk aversion see Biswas (1983).
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PROPOSITION 6. Given any asking price P , the price dis-
count, δ˜(P ), on the asking price is more (less) than the pure
price discount, δ(P ), if the seller is risk-averse (risk-prone).
Proof of Proposition 6. Partially differentiating VU with respect
to M and setting ∂VU/∂M =0, we get,
U(M)=E(U)+
∫ P
M
[U(π)−E(U)]f (π)dπ
ρ +φ
=E(U)+ φ
ρ +φ
∫ P
M
[U(π)−E(U)]f (π)
φ
dπ.
Note,
∫ P
M
f (π)/φdπ =1. In fact, f (π)/φ is a conditional pdf.
Hence, the above is rewritten as,
U(M)=E(U)
[
1− φ
ρ +φ
]
+ φ
ρ +φ
∫ P
M
U(π)
f (π)
φ
dπ.
Let π¯ =∫ P
M
πf (π)/φdπ . It is well known that
∫ P
M
U(π)f (π)/φdπ
is equal to U(π¯) when U is a linear function (risk-neutral-
ity), less than U(π¯) if U is concave and greater than U(π¯) if
U is convex. Since U(M) is a monotonically increasing func-
tion of M, it implies that M1<M0<M2, where M0, M1 and M2
are reservation prices under risk-neutral, risk-averse and risk-
prone attitudes. Since δ˜(P )=P −M, for any given price P the
proposition follows immediately. QED
In the case of a risk-neutral seller, the pure price discount,
δ(P ) = P − M0. Therefore, in the case of non-risk-neutrality,
the price discount is augmented by a risk attitude factor,
which is positive in the case of risk aversion and negative in
the case of risk-prone sellers.
PROPOSITION 7. Given the asking price P > a, the seller is
more likely to adopt a ﬁxed price policy if she is risk-prone.
Proof of Proposition 7. The price discount obtainable from
a risk-prone seller is δ˜(P ) = P − M2 = (P − M0) − (M2 − M0).
By proposition 6, M2 − M0 is positive if the seller is risk-
prone and consequently P − M2 is smaller. The more risk-
prone the seller is, the smaller is P − M2. If the seller is a
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highly risk-prone person, P −M2, and consequently GU in (12)
is very small. Suppose P ∗ and E∗(U) are the optimal ﬁxed
price and the associated expected utility. Let P and VU be the
optimal asking price and the associated expected utility. Since
VU =E(U)+GU , the seller will adopt a ﬁxed price policy if,
VU − H = E(U) + GU − H < E∗(U), where, H is the expected
utility-cost of haggling. Since, E(U) is maximised atP ∗, E(U)≤
E∗(U). We have noted, when the seller is highly risk-loving,
GU is very small. Therefore, the seller may prefer the ﬁxed
price strategy to the asking price strategy. QED
6. CONCLUSION
We have compared the asking price and ﬁxed price strate-
gies for selling an asset in an uncertain market. The ask-
ing price strategy requires simultaneous determination of the
optimal asking price and the minimum acceptable price (res-
ervation price). The gap between the two is the price dis-
count: the maximum reduction in price which the buyer may
obtain through bargaining. The asking price and the reserva-
tion price are affected by the seller’s attitude towards risk. The
attitude towards risk also affects the choice between a ﬁxed
price strategy and an asking price strategy. We identiﬁed three
primary reasons for the adoption of a ﬁxed price strategy: (i)
the item is so inexpensive that it is not worth negotiating the
price; (ii) the market for the asset is highly competitive; (iii)
the seller is highly risk-prone so that she would rather stick
to the ﬁxed price than sell immediately with a price discount.
Whilst it is theoretically possible that the optimal asking price
may be less than the optimal ﬁxed price, we show that if the
expected return function is strictly concave then the optimal
asking price must exceed the optimal ﬁxed price. The exist-
ing literature on optimal selling strategies mainly explores the
hypothetical situation in which the seller receives a sequence
of bids which she may or may not accept. In light of the past
revelations the seller revises her reservation price. We have
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mentioned a few such papers in the introduction. Our paper
takes a different strand in trying to analyse the more com-
mon strategy of setting an asking price and the determination
of price discounts associated with it. An analysis of the ask-
ing price strategy in an inter-temporal context and with the
relaxation of the assumption of risk-neutrality is an impor-
tant step towards an understanding of the theory of selling
strategies. This paper proves some useful results towards that
understanding.
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